Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia: An End to the Liberal Definition of Investment in ICSID Arbitrations by Given, John P.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-2009
Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia:
An End to the Liberal Definition of Investment in
ICSID Arbitrations
John P. Given
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John P. Given, Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia: An End to the Liberal Definition of Investment in ICSID Arbitrations, 31
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 467 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol31/iss3/4
Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v.
Malaysia: An End to the Liberal
Definition of "Investment" in ICSID
Arbitrations?
JOHN P. GIVEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 5, 1817, the Diana, a British merchant ship bound
for India, sunk off the coast of Malaysia in the Strait of Malacca
carrying more than eighteen tons of fine porcelain from China.' It
took Dorian Ball's marine salvage company, Malaysian Historical
Salvors ("MHS"), ten years just to find the wreckage of the
Diana,2 and four years for MHS to salvage and survey the
approximately 24,000 recovered items of her cargo.3 Almost 178
years to the day after the Diana was shipwrecked, Christie's
Amsterdam sold much of the salvaged porcelain and other items at
auction, fetching almost $3 million.'
* J.D., December 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to thank the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review for
their invaluable help and support. Special thanks are due to Professor Cesare P.R.
Romano for his encouragement on an early draft. Most of all, I thank my family - my wife,
Nancy, and children Sam and Ben - for the love and support that makes everything
possible.
1. Damon Vis-Dunbar, British Investor Sues Malaysia Over Sunken Treasure,
Pleadings Posted by ICSID, Investment Treaty News, Apr. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn-aprilll_2006.pdf; See also Malaysian Historical Salvors
Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10, Award (May 17, 2007),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC654_En&caseld=C247 [hereinafter Malaysian
Historical Salvors Arb.].
2. Rosemary McKittrick, Deep-Sea Treasures, LIVEAUCrION TALK,
http://www.liveauctiontalk.com/free-article-detail.php?articleid=464 (last visited May 22,.
2009).
3. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 13.
4. Id. See generally DORIAN BALL, THE DIANA ADVENTURE (1995) (providing an
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Nine and a half years later, a dispute between MHS and the
Malaysian government over the salvage company's compensation
was heard by the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID").' The sole arbitrator in the case,
Michael Hwang S.C.,6 determined that the agreement between
MHS and the Government of Malaysia did not satisfy the meaning
of "investment" as required by Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention, and ICSID, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to
hear the dispute.'
This note discusses the arbitrator's decision not to extend
ICSID jurisdiction to the MHS claim, in particular whether his
interpretation of "investment" under the ICSID Convention was
unnecessarily narrow. Part II summarizes the background and
procedural history of the case, and also discusses why the MHS v.
Malaysia award may be an important ICSID precedent. Part III
discusses the meaning of "investment" in the context of the ICSID
Convention and prior ICSID arbitral precedent. In Part IV, the
arbitrator's analysis of "investment" is discussed and critiqued.
Finally, Part V concludes that the arbitrator used an unnecessarily
narrow definition of "investment" in deciding the question of
ICSID jurisdiction. By overlapping the analysis of multiple factors
on "investment" with a kind of "negative feedback" or "piling on"
interesting history of the Diana as well as detailing the complex process of finding and
salvaging the wreck site).
5. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 18.
6. Mr. Hwang maintains a professional web site outlining the highlights of his legal
career, including his numerous arbitration appointments. Welcome to Michael Hwang
S.C., http://www.mhwang.com (last visited May 22, 2009).
7. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 146; International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules art. 25(1)
Jan. 2003, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdocen-
archive/ICSIDEnglish.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. Note that the award on
jurisdiction was annulled in April 2009 by the two to one decision of a subsequent ICSID
tribunal, following MHS's application for annulment. See Malaysian Historical Salvors
Sdn., Bhd.. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the
Application for Annulment and attached Dissenting Opinion .(April 16, 2009), both
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=viewCase&reqFrom=Home&caseld=C247. Damon Vis-Dunbar has
written an excellent brief summary outlining the majority and dissenting views expressed
in the annulment and dissent. Damon Vis-Dunbar, Malaysian Historical Salvors
Jurisdictional Award Annulled; Committee Split On Question of Economic Development
as Criteria of ICSID Investments, Investment Treaty News, Apr. 23, 2009,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/04/23/malaysian-historical-
salvors-jurisdictional-award-annulled-committee-split-on-question-of-economic-
development-as-criteria-of-icsid-investments.aspx.
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effect, by minimizing some arguments of the Claimant, and by
failing to fully consider that the economic contribution factor may
sometimes require a broader factual context, the arbitrator's
definition of "investment" is considerably more conservative than
in previous cases.'
II. BACKGROUND, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANCE OF
MHS v. MALAYSIA
A. Background: The Marine Salvage Contract and the Dispute
Over Payment
Marine Historical Salvors Sdn. Bhd.9 entered into an
agreement with the Government of Malaysia on August 3, 1991.0
The contract called for MHS to locate the wreck of the British
merchant ship Diana, which had sunk off the coast of Malaysia in
1817, and to salvage, clean, restore, and catalog the recoverable
cargo.' 1 In exchange for MHS's services, and solely at MHS's risk
and expense, the Government of Malaysia agreed to a sliding scale
of compensation dependent on the total of the aggregate auction
value and appraised unsold artifacts. MHS would receive 70% if
the aggregate amount was $10 million or less, 60% if the amount
was between $10 and $20 million, and 50% if the amount was
above $20 million dollars. 12 Typical of many marine salvage
contracts, the agreement was made on a "no finds-no pay" basis,
meaning that MHS received no money in advance and would only
profit from the complex salvage operation if both the recovery and
auction were successful. 3
8. ICSID arbitration is not subject to the doctrine of stare decisis, but decisions and
awards can carry substantial precedential weight, particularly where they are considered
well-reasoned. See Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 1082
(2001); See also Transcript of USCIB Young Arbitrator's Forum Panel Discussion at 3,
Tai-Heng Cheng, Is There a System of Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, Oct.
22, 2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259943 [hereinafter Transcript of Tai-Heng
Cheng].
9. Sdn. Bhd. ("Sendirian Berhad") is the Malaysian corporate extension for a
limited liability company. Corporatelnformation.com, Company Extensions and Security
Identifies, hitp://www.corporateinformation.com/Company-Extensions-Security-
Identifiers.aspx (last visited May 22, 2009).
10. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 7.
11. Id. 17-8.
12. Id. 11. All dollar amounts mentioned in this note are in United States dollars.
13. Id. 1 10. See also Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10, Claimant's Memorial on Jurisdiction, at 7, (Mar. 15, 2006)
[hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Memorial]. Note that all MHS v.
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After four years of salvage, inventory, and restoration work,
items from the Diana were sold at auction in 1995 by Christie's
Amsterdam, bringing in $2.98 million. According to MHS, the
Government of Malaysia withheld items from the auction valued
at over $400,000.14 Per the contract formula, MHS should have
received 70% of the $3.38 million, or $2.37 million. Instead, the
Government of Malaysia paid MHS only $1.2 million, representing
approximately 40% of the auction proceeds, and no payment at all
for those items withheld from the auction. "S
When MHS received substantially less than expected under
the contract, the company initiated arbitration in Kuala Lumpur to
recover the difference per the contract's arbitration clause.'6 The
result of this initial arbitration, as well as subsequent appeals to
the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration and then to
the Malaysian High Court, was a denial of MHS's claim.17 An
application to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators alleging
improprieties during the Malaysian arbitration proceedings was
likewise denied. ,8
B. The Procedural History of the MHS v. Malaysia ICSID
Arbitration
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, part of the World Bank, was established by the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, which was ratified in October
1966.9 The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty among more
Malaysia pleadings referred to in this note are available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.
14. Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Memorial, supra note 13, at 10.
15. Id.
16. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 15.
17. Id. 116.
18. Id. 1 17. MHS explains the various attempts to recover its unpaid compensation
through diplomacy and arbitration prior to seeking ICSID arbitration in its Memorial on
Jurisdiction. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Memorial, supra note 13, at 10-
22. Malaysia's response is found in its own Reply Memorial. See Malaysian Historical
Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10, Respondent's
Reply Memorial on Objections to Jurisdiction, at 30-43, (Apr. 19, 2006) [hereinafter
Malaysian Historical Salvors Reply].
19. ICSID - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last visited May 22, 2009) [hereinafter ICSID].
The convention is known as either the ICSID Convention or the Washington Convention.
See ICSID - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICISD,
http://icsid.worldbank.orglICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Show
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than 140 nations, the purpose of which is to encourage investment
in developing nations by providing an arbitration forum for
settlement of investment disputes between contracting states and
investors within those states. 2o ICSID is the "leading international
arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute
settlement." 21
In September 2004, MHS registered a request for arbitration
with ICSID against the Government of Malaysia under the
bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") between the United Kingdom
and the Government of Malaysia.22 As in the vast majority of cases
brought under the 1965 ICSID Convention, MHS v. Malaysia
began with a challenge to ICSID jurisdiction by the respondent.'
Malaysia challenged ICSID jurisdiction on several grounds,
arguing that: (1) both the Claimant and the claim fell outside the
scope of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention; (2) both the
Claimant and the claim fell outside the scope of Article 7 of the
BIT; and (3) MHS's claim was not an "investment" under the
BIT. 2
4
The arbitrator agreed with Malaysia that the contract was
"not an 'investment' within the meaning of Article 25(1) of the
ICSID Convention," and so dismissed the arbitration claim for
want of jurisdiction. 2' Because the finding on "investment" was
dispositive, the arbitrator did not consider the other jurisdictional
challenges raised by the Government of Malaysia. 26
Home&pageName=About.ICSID-Home (last visited May 22, 2009) [hereinafter About
ICSID].
20. See About ICSID, supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 18. Note that'some arbitration
documents refer to the bilateral investment treaty as the IGA rather than the BIT. For
simplification this note uses the term BIT exclusively. See e.g., Malaysian Historical
Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10, Respondent's
Memorial on Objections to Jurisdiction, at 2, (Mar. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Malaysian
Historical Salvors Respondent's Memorial].
23. Eloise Obadia, ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging
Issues, 18 ICSID NEWS 2001, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPubicationsRH&acti
onVal=ViewPublications&reqFrom=Main (select "News from ICSID", then select "Fall
2001"); Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 91 30.
24. Malaysian Historical Salvors Reply, supra note 18, at 4-5.
25. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 9 146.
26. Id. 1 148-49. Those arguments are also not discussed in this Note.
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C. The Relevance of the MHS v. Malaysia Award"7
MHS v. Malaysia could have been a potentially important
ICSID precedent for several reasons. First, the arbitrator
provided a detailed analysis of important existing ICSID
precedent on "investment."29  Numerous arbitrations have
addressed the meaning of "investment" under the ICSID treaty,
and the arbitrator provided an excellent summary of current
general practice in his extensive analysis of these cases. In
addition, discussion of the MHS v. Malaysia facts and how they
relate to precedent is clear and well organized.
Second, MHS v. Malaysia was the first marine salvage claim
brought before ICSID.3 ° As such, it stands to reason that
resolution of the case could have significant weight in future
marine salvage claim cases. The opinion might have even deterred
the filing of future claims under ICSID. After all, if the largest
contract within the marine salvage industry 3' doesn't constitute
"investment," how could any other similar agreement?
Third, because jurisdiction was found to be lacking solely on
the basis of ICSID Convention Article 25(1), there are no
collateral issues clouding the analysis. Untangling the potentially
complicated interplay of the differing meanings of "investment"
under both ICSID and the BIT, for example, is not required to
understand the arbitrator's holding.
Finally, MHS v. Malaysia was the first ICSID arbitration to
make all pleadings publicly available. 32 The availability of the
pleadings allows for a more complete understanding of the process
and context of parties' arguments by scholars, practitioners, and
27. This Article was written in the spring of 2008, long before the Award on
Jurisdiction was annulled by a subsequent tribunal. See note 7, supra. Although the award,
now annulled, can have no precedential value, the opinion of the Sole Arbitrator is still
important as being a well written expression of a conservative approach to ICSID
jurisdiction on investment.
28. There is no formal stare decisis in ICSID arbitration, however arbitrators
frequently refer to previous arbitral decisions for guidance. See SCHREUER, supra note 8,
121; Transcript of Tai-Heng Cheng, supra note 8, at 3. Indeed, Michael Hwang S.C.
relies heavily on arbitral precedent throughout the MHS Award. See generally Malaysian
Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1.
29. ICSID Arbitration: What Is An "Investment"?, PRAC. LAW COMPANY, Jun. 18,
2007, at 1, http://dispute.practicallaw.com/2-368-0976 (last visited May 22, 2009)
[hereinafter What Is An "Investment"?].
30. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, T 129.
31. Id. 9 134.
32. Vis-Dunbar, supra note 1, at 1.
[Vol. 31:467
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future arbitrators than was previously possible looking only at the
awards themselves. Practitioners will undoubtedly benefit from
more fully understanding how the arbitrator addressed the
jurisdiction issue, and the opinion may be a useful guide for parties
desiring to either create or avoid ICSID jurisdiction when drafting
future agreements. The practice of publishing all ICSID pleadings
will hopefully become a common occurrence.
III. THE MEANING OF "INVESTMENT" IN THE ICSID CONVENTION
The concept of "consent" is central to the meaning of ICSID
jurisdiction." A Contracting State does not consent to ICSID
jurisdiction in all cases simply by participating in the Convention.'
Consent may be obtained through direct agreement of the parties,
by legislation of the host State, or through an investment treaty."
For example, MHS argued that Malaysia's consent to ICSID
jurisdiction arose from the signing and ratifying of the
UK/Malaysia BIT.3" The investor may signal its consent to
jurisdiction simply by instituting ICSID proceedings." This is how
MHS communicated its consent in MHS v. Malaysia.38 Parties may
also draft the Centre into their agreements as the arbitration
forum for any disputes that might arise. "
On the other hand, mutual consent of the parties to ICSID
jurisdiction, however communicated, is not enough; the dispute
must still satisfy the Convention's "investment" requirement."° The
rationale for this is clear: if parties could determine the meaning of
"investment" completely on their own, then the independent
jurisdictional requirements under Article 25(1) of the Convention
would be meaningless."1
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention states, in part, that the
Centre's jurisdiction "shall extend to any legal dispute arising
33. See ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at Preamble; see also SCHREUER, supra note
8, at 89-90.
34. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 11.
35. Id. at 126.
36. Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Memorial, supra note 13, at 28-31.
37. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 207-08.
38. Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Memorial, supra note 13, at 29-30.
39. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 126.
40. Id. at 125.
41. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/11, Award,
50, Aug. 6, 2004, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
=CasesRH&actionVal=ListConcluded [hereinafter Joy Mining Mach. Ltd.].
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directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State... and
a national of another Contracting State.,4 2  But although
"investment" is fundamental to ICSID jurisdiction, there is no
definition or description of "investment" contained within the
Convention itself. 3 Efforts to define the term during drafting of
the Convention were ultimately fruitless, despite much
discussion." Even an effort to limit jurisdiction to disputes with a
minimum claim size was rejected, due to concern that important
test cases falling below that threshold might be excluded. 45 This
last point is important, because it suggests that at least some
drafters of the ICSID Convention favored a liberal theory of
jurisdiction, one that would provide a greater chance for novel
claims of legal significance to be heard on their merits.
Not all claims are proper under the ICSID Convention. A
typical commercial sale contract will usually not satisfy the ICSID
"investment" requirement. 46 Other types of contracts, for example
construction contracts, loans, contractual transfers of technical
knowledge to a Contracting State, are generally found to be
investments by ICSID tribunals." But whether the contract at
issue in MHS v. Malaysia should be considered a commercial
contract or an investment contract is not immediately clear from
the award. The arbitrator noted that contributions to the host state
are "largely similar to those which might have been made under a
commercial salvage contract." ' He also stated that the risks under
the contract appeared to be "no more than ordinary commercial
risks assumed by many salvors in a salvage contract." 49 But had the
arbitrator made a finding that the agreement was a commercial
contract, it is unlikely, and illogical, that he would have made such
an in-depth analysis on the "investment" factors, for if the contract
42. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
43. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 121.
44. Id. at 122-125.
45. A minimum jurisdictional limit of $100,000, though attractive to some delegates,
was ultimately left out of the ICSID Convention. Id. at 123.
46. Resolving Foreign Investment Disputes Using An ICSID Arbitration, MALLESONS
STEPHEN JAQUES, available at http://www.mallesons.com/publications/
update/2005/8151043w.htm (last visited May 22, 2009); see also Joy Mining Mach. Ltd.,
supra note 41, 52 (citing I.F.I. Shihata and A. Parra, The Experience of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 299, 308 n. 27 (1999)).
47. Resolving Foreign Investment Disputes Using An ICSID Arbitration, supra note
46.
48. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, T 109.
49. Id. T 112.
474 [Vol. 31:467
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were merely commercial, no analysis of investment factors would
have been necessary. That the "investment" analysis was done at
all strongly suggests that the arbitrator was unable or unwilling to
declare the contract to be merely a commercial contract.
Though the Convention itself contains no objective definition
of "investment," the first sentence of the Preamble to the
Convention refers to the "need for international cooperation for
economic development."*0 This statement can hardly be considered
even an incomplete definition of "investment." But the Preamble
wording suggests that whatever else "investment" may mean, for
ICSID to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the result of the
investment must be "some positive impact on [economic]
development" in the host State. 5'
Accordingly, ICSID awards discussing the meaning of
"investment" have frequently focused on economic development.
For example, of the seven cases regarded by the arbitrator in MHS
v. Malaysia as most important to the interpretation of
"investment" under Article 25(1), all stress to some extent that
economic development is a necessary component of investment,
though the degree of economic development required among them
varies. 52 One tribunal required only that the investment contribute
"in one way or another to the economic development of the host
State."5 3  Another tribunal suggested that the economic
development must be "significant."54 Other arbitral opinions on
"investment" fall somewhere between these extremes, either
suggesting that the notion of significance is subsumed within the
typical characteristics of investment," or finding that an
50. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at Preamble (emphasis added).
51. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 125.
52. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1$ 56, 113-18.
53. Id. 96 (citing Patrick Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/9917)
(emphasis removed). Note that the Patrick Mitchell Award was subsequently annulled, so
its value as precedent may be minimal; further, though the Patrick Mitchell Award was
cited in MHS v. Malaysia, the Annulment was published prior to the issuance of the
Award on Jurisdiction. See Patrick Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARBI9917, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, Nov. 1, 2006,
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf [hereinafter Mitchell v.
Congo Annulment Decision]; see id. 90, n.12 (explaining that only the Patrick Mitchell
award, and not the annulment, is relied on by the MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator).
54. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., supra note 41, 53.
55. Consortium Grouopement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. Algeria, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/03/8, Sentence Arbitrale, Part II 1 14(ii), Jan. 10, 2005, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVa=ListC
2009]
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investment was "significant" on the particular facts of the dispute
without appearing to make significance a prerequisite to
jurisdiction.16 While economic development is but one of several
characteristics important to the determination of jurisdiction, it
was highly dispositive of the jurisdictional issue in MHS v.
Malaysia. 7
Another approach used to determine if an investment
qualifies for ICSID jurisdiction, initially suggested by then ICSID
Executive Director Aron Broches during the draft discussions, is
whether the investment is one that is "readily recognizable." 8 This
method seems most useful in cases where the nature of the
investment suggests on its face that jurisdiction cannot be
reasonably challenged solely on the basis of a lack of investment
under the Convention.
A more common approach in determining- "investment"
under Article 25(1) is to compare the typical features of
investment with the specific facts of the case at hand.' Using this
approach, characterized in MHS v. Malaysia as the Typical
Characteristics Approach, tribunals determine to what extent
factors such as duration, regularity of profit and return, risk,
substantial commitment, and economic development are present. "
The Typical Characteristics Approach is holistic in nature and is
contrasted with the Jurisdictional Approach, where tribunals
oncluded [hereinafter L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v. Algeria Sentence]; Malaysian Historical
Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 113.
56. Jan de Nul N.V. v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/13, Decision on
Jurisdiction, IT 90-96, June 16, 2006; Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 64, May 24, 1999 [hereinafter Ceskoslovenska Decision on Jurisdiction].
Link to both files available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
=CasesRH&actionVal=ListConcluded.
57. See infra Part IV, particularly discussion of the arbitrator's justification for
requiring a greater showing of economic development in Part IV.E.
58. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 124.
59. See, e.g., PSEG Global Inc. v. Turkey, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/5,
Decision on Jurisdiction, at 1-52, June 4, 2004, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListC
oncluded.; see also Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 119-21 (explaining
that the $800 million build-operate-transfer contract for construction of a power plant in
PSEG was so clearly a readily recognized investment for ICSID purposes that analysis of
investment was simply not undertaken).
60. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 70; see also SCHREUER,
supra note 8, at 140.
61. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 70; see also SCHREUER,
supra note 8, at 140.
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generally require all of the elements to be present in order to find
jurisdiction. 62
The Typical Characteristics Approach can be regarded as
more liberal and the Jurisdictional Approach can be regarded as
more conservative. However, as explained by the MHS v. Malaysia
arbitrator, the two approaches are properly regarded as two sides
of the same coin and should generally lead to similar results.63
Tribunals will likely invoke the Jurisdictional Approach when the
classic hallmarks of investment are clearly present.' On the other
hand, tribunals are likely to invoke the Typical Characteristics
Approach in order to find that the investment requirement is met
when the analysis is less clear.' In either case, the MHS v.
Malaysia arbitrator noted that the classic hallmarks of investment
"are not a punch list of items which, if completely punched off, will
automatically lead to a conclusion that there is an 'investment.
'' '
As with other international tribunals, and as the MHS v.
Malaysia arbitrator correctly pointed out, "there is no doctrine of
stare decisis in ICSID jurisprudence."'67 However, prior arbitral
awards can have a strong influence, even though they are
subsidiary to customary law, treaties, and general principles. 6 The
somewhat inconsistent application and influence of arbitral
precedent can sometimes create strange and conflicting results. 69
It is important to keep in mind that, although each of the
investment characteristics is analyzed separately, there is
inevitably some overlap among them. According to arbitral
precedent, this is to be expected, and is frequently pointed out in
decisions." The MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator acknowledged this in
62. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 70.
63. See id. 105.
64. See id. 71(a).
65. See id. 71(b).
66. Id. I 106(e).
67. Id. 1 56. See also SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 1082.
68. See generally Transcript of Tai-Heng Cheng, supra note 8 at 2-6 (commenting on
the blurring of this standard somewhat over time by arbitrators).
69. See id. at 3, n.2 (describing two ICSID arbitration results, which were decided
within six months of one another, where the claimants in both cases were ironically the
same company, and whose holdings were diametrically opposed).
70. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 150, Nov. 14,
2005, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=ListPending [hereinafter Bayindir v. Pakistan]; Salini Construtorri
S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
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the award by citing the Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi
A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Jan de Nul N. V. v.- Egypt, and
Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco awards, which
proposed that "the various elements or hallmarks of 'investment'
must be 'examined in their totality and will normally depend on
the circumstances of each case.' 7 This somewhat fuzzy approach
seems useful and fair when used positively to allow ICSID
jurisdiction. The approach is open to criticism on fairness grounds,
however, when an arbitrator finds that a deficiency of just one
investment factor negatively impacts one or more additional
factors.
For example, if the duration of the contract is thought of
solely as a mechanism that determines the level of risk and falls
below an arbitrary threshold, this may obscure the fact that the
investor was at a considerable risk during that time. In order to
avoid a "piling on" or "negative bootstrapping" effect, it is critical
to distinguish between judging the investment facts in their totality
and inadvertently blurring the lines between factors. Otherwise, a
negative fact that properly goes to the satisfaction of one
characteristic may be used repeatedly to undercut other
characteristics with which it has no direct connection. 72
Moreover, it is important to remember that ICSID tribunals
have generally construed the meaning of "investment" liberally,
finding that the satisfaction of definitional elements is "not a
formal prerequisite" to jurisdiction.73 Tribunals have not required
"clear evidence to establish a finding that each of the relevant
hallmarks was present."74 The MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator found
that the purpose of analyzing prior ICSID cases was "not slavishly
to adhere to precedent, but rather to discern a broad trend which
emerges from ICSID jurisprudence on the 'investment'
requirement."75 In ICSID arbitration, the broad trend appears to
be a preference for erring on the side of finding an "investment"
Jurisdiction, 43-58, July 23, 2001, reprinted in 42 I.L.M 609, at 622 [hereinafter Salini];
Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., supra note 41, 1 40.
71. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1 101 (emphasis added) (citing
Jan de Nul N.V. v. Egypt, supra note 56, 91).
72. This point is further clarified with a discussion and critique of the MHS
investment analysis in Part IV.
73. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, $ 98 (quoting
Ceskoslovenska Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 56, 1 90) (emphasis omitted).
74. Id. 91 103.
75. Id. 9104.
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under the Convention in close cases. As a result of this preference,
disputes are more likely to be heard on the merits or, at least,
other jurisdictional issues will be considered. 6
In his analysis of "investment," the MHS v. Malaysia
arbitrator used a hybrid of the typical characteristics and
jurisdictional approaches."' One would expect this liberal approach
to provide the best opportunity for a finding of jurisdiction. This
was not the case.
IV. ARGUMENT: THE ANALYSIS OF "INVESTMENT" IN MHS v.
MALAYSIA
The MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator's analysis of "investment" is
organized as follows: (1) consideration of regularity of profit and
returns, (2) contributions of the investor to the host State, (3)
duration of the contract, (4) risks assumed under the contract, and
(5) economic development of the host State. 8 This section tracks
the analysis in the same order.
A. Regularity of Profit and Return
The "[r]egularity of profit and return" is identified as one of
the typical hallmarks of investment." This requirement is
prominently featured in several important arbitration decisions.
On the other hand, other classic and oft-cited cases in which the
"investment" requirement is satisfied do not mention the
regularity of profit and return at all. 8
The arbitrator accepted the claimant's reasoning that the
regularity of profit and return during the course of the contract
was immaterial to whether or not there was an "investment."
Likening its salvage of the Diana to the development of a new
drug by a pharmaceutical company, MHS successfully argued that
there are some cases where "investment" can be found even
76. See, e.g., Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/96/3,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, at 1382-87, July 11, 1997, reprinted
in 37 I.L.M. 1378, at 1381-84 (1998) [hereinafter Fedax].
77. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1 65-106.
78. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1$ 107-46.
79. See SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 140.
80. See, e.g., Fedax, supra note 76, at 1387; Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., supra note 41,
53.
81. See e.g., Salini, supra note 70, 52.
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though there is no regularity of return.' In MHS v. Malaysia, there
was a "regular and steady accretion of 'investment' ... as work
progressed" but no actual return to the marine salvage company
until the auction of the recovered items. The MHS arbitrator
agreed that the regularity of profit and return was not a "classical
hallmark" of investment. ' Thus, the absence of the typical
hallmark of the regularity of profit and return seems to have been
excused by the arbitrator.
B. Contributions of the Investor to the Host State
The MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator's analysis of MHS's
contribution to Malaysia in the award on jurisdiction occupies but
one paragraph that contains all of three sentences. 85 The arbitrator
found that there was no dispute regarding MHS's contributions,
noting that MHS "made contributions in money, in kind and in
industry." 6 At first blush, then, it appears that MHS satisfied this
hallmark of investment because of the lack of dispute and minimal
analysis. However, it is uncertain whether or not the arbitrator
considered the contribution characteristic satisfied, as this was not
clearly communicated in the award. 87
The MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator compared MHS's
contribution to Malaysia unfavorably to the contributions made in
Salini, Bayindir, Jan de Nul, and Joy Mining.' The contracts in
. 82. See Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn. Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/05/10, Claimant's Post-Jurisdiction Hearing Notes & Points, at 28-29, June 26,
2006 [hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimaint's Notes & Points].
83. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 108.
84. Id.
85. See id. 109.
86. Id.
87. The MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator does not provide a conclusion on "contribution."
See id.J 109. Moreover, there is only a general holding at the end of the award, with.no
specific summary of the characteristics that passed and those that failed. See id. 146.
88. See id. 109. Granted, the comparison lacked specificity and the contract prices in
those cases were all considerably larger in magnitude. In Salini, for example, a fifty
kilometer Moroccan highway was constructed for a contract price of approximately $30
million. See Salini, supra note 70, 2. In Bayindir, the contract was for an even larger
highway project in Pakistan, where a 30% advance of approximately $160 million was
made by the contracting State prior to construction. See Bayindir v. Pakistan, supra note
70, 17. The Jan de Nul contract was for dredging work done in the Suez Canal, which
was assessed a value of approximately $130 million in the Egyptian administrative courts.
See Jan de Nul N.V. v. Egypt, supra note 56, 1 17. The Joy Mining agreement related to a
contract for phosphate mining equipment, which had an initial contract price of
approximately $22 million (and was later reduced to approximately $16 million). See Joy
Mining Mach. Ltd., supra note 41, J$ 15-17. Of these cases, jurisdiction was denied only
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those cases all dealt in some way with the development of
substantial infrastructure within the host State. This suggests that
the arbitrator may have blurred or confused the characteristic of
contribution by the investor to the host State with the
characteristic of economic development of the host State.
Professor Christoph H. Schreuer, a noted ICSID scholar, does not
use the characteristic of "contribution," but rather the similar
characteristic of "substantial commitment."' Professor Schreuer
describes this characteristic as being distinct from economic
development. 0
Despite the fact that MHS performed its part of the bargain
without compensation for more than four years, MHS's substantial
contribution of time and money appears to have been disregarded
due to the modest economic development obtained by Malaysia
following the salvage operation and auction. Moreover, the
arbitrator appears to have minimized the actual contributions of
MHS because the perceived economic benefit to Malaysia was
small. Since these very points were later used to undercut the
economic development hallmark, this approach by the arbitrator is
neither logical, nor equitable to MHS. 9
An interesting question not addressed in the award is whether
the parties' expectations regarding the size of the contribution or
economic benefit should have any bearing on the satisfaction of
those characteristics. The contract terms contemplated a much
greater potential return to Malaysia, as much as $20 million or
more. ' This figure is four to five times greater than the amount
obtained, depending on whether or not the items that Malaysia
held out of the auction are counted. This larger theoretical return
might have occurred with the same contribution of time, materials,
effort, and money by MHS, if the materials salvaged had simply
returned more value at the auction or if more precious salvageable
materials had been found. Marine salvage finds in -the tens of
in Joy Mining because the dispute itself was for the release of bank guarantees and, in the
context of the agreement, these were not considered "investment." The Joy Mining
Tribunal did not deny jurisdiction because of the relatively modest amount involved in the
contract. See id. 41-45.
89. See SCHREUER, supra note 41, at 140; Christoph Schreuer, Professor at University
of Vienna, http://public.univie.ac.at/index.php?id=14319 (last visited May 22, 2009).
90. See SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 140.
91. In Part III, this is the phenomenon identified as "piling on" or "negative
bootstrapping."
92. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 11.
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millions of dollars are rare, but they are not unknown. For
example, an eighth century Chinese ship that was found in 1997
was worth an estimated $40 million.'.' Moreover, salvage
operations uncovered additional valuable recoverable vessels that
were not covered under the contract, and MHS also found two
additional shipwrecks as they searched for the Diana. One of
these, the wreck of the Kapal Sultan, was valued at more than
$940,000 by Malaysia's own expert appraiser. ' This additional find
does not appear to have been considered a contribution of MHS
by the arbitrator, as there is no mention of it in the brief discussion
on contribution.'
Furthermore, the amount raised at the auction could not have
been known when the contract was created. Accordingly,
contribution by MHS must be considered apart from any economic
benefit received by Malaysia for the reason that the two
characteristics describe two conceptually distinct hallmarks of
investment. One wonders, had the final auction amount raised
been much larger, whether this would have positively impacted the
arbitrator's analysis of MHS's commitment. Logically, it should
not have.
Conflation of the contribution and economic development
hallmarks is further evidenced in the arbitrator's analysis of
economic development. "[T]he Tribunal concludes that there was
no substantial contribution because the nature of the benefits that
the Contract offered to Malaysia did not provide substantial
benefits in the sense envisaged in previous ICISD [sic]
jurisprudence."' In fact, previous jurisprudence is largely in
agreement with the notion that there is neither a fixed minimum
economic benefit requirement nor a fixed minimum contribution
requirement. ' "[T]he question of whether an expenditure
constitutes an investment or not is hardly to be governed by
whether or not the expenditure is large or small."98
93. See Raja M., Shipwreck Salvors See Treasure for the Taking, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
Sept. 17, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_AsiaFI17AeO5.html.
94. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimaint's Notes & Points, supra note 82, at 24.
95. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 109.
96. Id. $ 143 (emphasis added).
97. See SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 123; Ceskoslovenska Decision on Jurisdiction,
supra note 56, 66.
98. Mihaly Int'l Corp. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/2, Award,
Mar. 15, 2002, available at
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The arbitrator clearly found that MHS's investment could not
be considered substantial enough to satisfy the contribution
hallmark." In a paragraph discussing this finding the arbitrator
referred to his later reasoning for economic contribution to the
host State."° This shows that at least some blurring of the two
hallmarks occurred. It may be the arbitrator's opinion that the
economic benefit to Malaysia was not substantial enough. The
economic benefit should have been considered separately from the
contribution made by MHS, however, because roughly the same
effort by MHS could have netted a very wide range of return for
Malaysia under the contract, depending on auction returns. This
expectation of the parties should have been considered, and likely
would have weighed in MHS's favor given the possible much
higher return to Malaysia.
C. Duration of the Contract
As Professor Schreuer noted, there is an expectation that
investment requires some duration. 101 Just as investment is not
defined in the Convention, however, neither is an appropriate
minimum contract duration specified. In practice, the minimum
duration thought necessary to satisfy "investment" within ICSID
jurisdiction, as discussed in Salini and accepted by the MHS v.
Malaysia arbitrator, is from two to five years. 102 The Joy Mining
Mach. Ltd. tribunal agreed with this general approach, but found
that duration was not of particular significance since the contract
price in that case was "paid in its totality at an early stage." 103 As
mentioned above, in the present case the situation regarding
duration is almost the opposite of Joy Mining Mach. Ltd.: the
contract was on a "no-finds, no-pay" basis, so MHS would only get
paid upon completion of the contract, followed by successful
auction of recovered items. These facts could make duration a
particularly important characteristic in MHS v. Malaysia.
The contract term for duration between MHS and Malaysia
was originally eighteen months, although the contract was
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListC
oncluded.
99. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 63.
100. Compare Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 63 with 1$ 125-44.
101. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 140.
102. Salini, supra note 70, at 622-623.
103. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., supra note 41, 57.
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extended to four years by mutual consent of the parties. " Thus,
the four-year term could be seen as satisfying the doctrinal
requirement for duration on that basis alone.
Some contracts have satisfied the duration requirement partly
on the basis that similar contracts are often extended. For
example, the L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v. Algeria Sentence tribunal found
that duration was satisfied in part because similar projects
frequently have time extensions and warranties. " On the other
hand, duration in the analysis of that case was primarily a measure
of the significance of the economic commitment by the builder to
the economic development of the project State. " In addition, the
fifty-month term in L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v. Algeria Sentence alone
would likely have satisfied the duration requirement. In Bayindir
v. Pakistan, the initial three-year construction term was followed
by a one-year term warranting defects and a four-year
maintenance period. 107 The Bayindir v. Pakistan tribunal agreed
with the L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v. Algeria Sentence tribunal that the
bar for duration need not be set particularly high for certain types
of contracts, such as construction projects, because such contracts
frequently require time extensions. The MHS v. Malaysia
arbitrator did not extend this lowered expectation for certain types
of contracts to marine salvage contracts, though it seems obvious
on the facts of the case that marine salvage contracts might also
frequently require time extensions for completion of the work, as
actually happened during performance of the Diana salvage
contract. '08
Though the arbitrator cited both the L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v.
Algeria Sentence and Bayindir v. Pakistan tribunals for the
proposition that contract extensions can be considered when
determining whether duration was satisfied, he nonetheless found
that duration was not satisfied. " In coming to this conclusion, the
arbitrator used two related and inventive theories to minimize the
actual length of MHS's performance under the contract.
104. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1 110.
105. L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v. Algeria Sentence, supra note 55, Part II, 1 14(ii)..
106. Id.
107. Bayindir v. Pakistan, supra note 70, 133. As in L.E.S.L-DIPENTA v. Algeria
Sentence, the initial contract term in Bayindir v. Pakistan would have satisfied the two to
five year Salini duration requirement.
108. As noted above, the salvage operation was extended from 18 months to four
years. See also supra Part II.A.
109. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, J$ 110-111.
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First, he divided the duration requirement into two
components, quantitative and qualitative, both of which require
satisfaction."' The arbitrator found that MHS satisfied the
quantitative requirement, because performance of the contract
actually took four years. ' The qualitative requirement, however,
was not satisfied. The arbitrator reasoned that "[o]ne might well
argue that the Contract was only able to meet the minimum length
of time of two years because of the element of fortuity." 112 In fact,
neither party made this argument, nor cited precedent suggesting
that satisfying duration fortuitously rather than intentionally ought
to somehow negate actual satisfaction of this requirement. 13
The arbitrator further found that the salvage contract could
theoretically have been completed in eighteen months, and
moreover that MHS was obligated to have completed the work
within that time. 114 Nothing in the record suggests that Malaysia
sought to enforce any contract rights relative to the initial term of
eighteen months. On the contrary, the arbitrator's award clearly
indicates that the contract between MHS and Malaysia was
"extended by mutual consent." . The arbitrator did not cite any
precedent embracing his new quantitative/qualitative approach to
the duration hallmark, nor did the respondent, Malaysia, suggest
that such an approach should be taken in any of the publicly
available pleadings and communications. 116
110. Id.
111. Id. 1[110.
112. Id.
113. An interesting question is how the arbitrator might have handled fortuity in a
slightly different context. Had the contract called for a term of thirty-six months (therefore
facially satisfying the duration hallmark), but through fortuity the wreck was found on the
very first day of searching and the contract work actually completed before two years'
time, would this sort of fortuity also cut in a negative direction, or would it make no
difference to the analysis?
114. Id.
115. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1 110 (emphasis added).
116. Id.; see also Malaysian Historical Salvors Respondent's Memorial, supra note 22;
Malaysian Historical Salvors Reply, supra note 18; Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn. Bhd.
v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10, Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief,
June 26, 2006 [hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors Respondent's Brief]; Malaysian
Historical Salvors, Sdn. Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10,
Respondent's Comments on the Issue of "Investment" Within the Meaning of Article
25(1) of the ICSID Convention, Dec. 13, 2006 [hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors
Respondent's December Comments]; and Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn. Bhd. v.
Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/10, Respondent's Comments on the Issue
of "Investment" Within the Meaning of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, Mar. 22,
2007 [hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors Respondent's March Comments].
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Second, the arbitrator once again used the economic
development of the host State as an associated factor to negatively
impact the distinct duration requirement. Rationalizing that if the
"underlying contract does not promote the economy of the host
State, there may be less justification to factor in the extensions
granted under the Contract," the arbitrator heavily discounted the
actual length of performance under the contract by MHS. ""
Taken together, these two novel approaches by the arbitrator
resulted in a showing of, at best, weak satisfaction of the duration
requirement. Though the language used in the award is not
explicit, the implication is clear that something more than
quantitative satisfaction of the duration hallmark is necessary;
qualitative satisfaction is also required. 118
As discussed in Part IV.B, this "piling on" approach, using
one hallmark of investment to defeat another, is neither logical nor
equitable. The arbitrator so closely associated satisfaction of the
economic development hallmark with satisfaction of the duration
hallmark that it was all but impossible for MHS to satisfy the
duration factor. In addition, and as will be discussed below, this
circularity contributed significantly to the arbitrator's decision to
require an even greater showing of economic contribution than
might otherwise have been necessary if the actual contract term
had been thought to satisfy the duration characteristic.
D. Risks Assumed under the Contract
Previous tribunals have established that participation by the
investor in the risks of the transaction is one of the primary
hallmarks of "investment" for purposes of ICSID jurisdiction. "'
According to Professor Schreuer, contract risks are usually
assumed by both parties. 120 In MHS v. Malaysia, the marine
salvage company not only participated in the risks under the
contract, it assumed all of the risks. As even the arbitrator
acknowledged: "[i]t is not in dispute that all the risks of the
Contract were borne by the Claimant," and "not in any way borne
by the Respondent." 121 One would think that brief analysis of risk
in the MHS case would necessarily result in a finding that MHS
117. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 111.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Salini, supra note 70, at 622.
120. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 140.
121. Id. T 112.
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easily satisfied the risk requirement. Unfortunately for MHS, the
arbitrator seemed unwilling to concede even this small point. Just
as he distinguished between quantitative and qualitative
satisfaction of the duration requirement, the arbitrator also
distinguished between quantitative and qualitative satisfaction of
the requirement of risks assumed under the contract by MHS. "
And as with the duration hallmark, there appears to be no prior
arbitral precedent for making such a distinction. "2
In addition to creating a new methodology for determining
satisfaction of the risk hallmark, the arbitrator made much of the
fact that "salvage contracts are often on a 'no-finds-no-pay' basis,"
as was the case in MHS v. Malaysia. 2' Because salvage contracts
are usually "no-finds-no-pay," the arbitrator found that risks under
such contracts should be considered "normal commercial risks.""
The arbitrator stated that MHS did not provide convincing reasons
why this should be otherwise. '26 In its pleadings, however, MHS
suggested that its risks included much more than the notion that
the wreck site would not be found. The risks not only included the
commercial risk as noted by the arbitrator, but also
"financial/enterprise risk, political risk, currency risk, legal; [sic]
risk, as well as risk of life and limb." 127 Despite identification by
MHS of numerous substantial risks beyond any commercial risks
that were also present, the arbitrator found that all risks in the
contract fell under the "no-finds-no-pay" heading, and were
therefore all "normal commercial risks." "8 Making the same
quantitative/qualitative distinction as he had in the duration
122. Id.
123. Review of all the ICSID cases cited within this note, for example, discloses no
discussion of a qualitative/quantitative distinction of the risk (or any other) hallmark, let
alone any reliance on it to justify denial of ICSID jurisdiction. Note that these include the
seven cases cited by the arbitrator as most important on the issue of "investment:" Salini,
Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., Jan de Nul N. V. v. Egypt, L.E.S.L-DIPENTA v. Algeria Sentence,
Bayindir v. Pakistan, Ceskoslovenska Decision on Jurisdiction, and Mitchell v. Congo
Annulment Decision. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 56.
124. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, T 112.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/05/10, Claimaint's Supplemental Comments on the Issue of "Investment", at 10,
Dec. 17, 2006 [hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Comments].
128. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 112.
2009]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
hallmark, the arbitrator found only quantitative, and not
qualitative, satisfaction of the risk requirement. 129
More fundamentally, the arbitrator's analysis of risk suggests
that he conflated this specific criterion of "investment" with the
much broader general proposition that "an ordinary commercial
contract cannot be considered as 'investment."' 130 The arbitrator
made clear that the contract between MHS and Malaysia was "not
a 'readily-recognizable' 'investment.."' 3 It is far from clear,
however, that the arbitrator's intention was to deny jurisdiction to
MHS on the basis that "no-finds-no-pay" marine salvage contracts
are necessarily ordinary commercial contracts, or even that the
specific agreement between MHS and Malaysia was an ordinary
commercial contract. Had the arbitrator made this finding,
detailed analysis of the various investment criteria would have
been unnecessary. 32 Perhaps more importantly, new limitations on
the doctrinal definition of "investment" requiring both
quantitative and qualitative satisfaction of both duration and risk,
as well as the introduction of a theory of fortuitousness within the
analysis of the duration hallmark, were also unnecessary. That the
arbitrator provided in-depth examination of the important
"investment" cases and also a detailed analysis of the individual
hallmarks. as they apply to the facts of MHS v. Malaysia in his
award strongly suggests that this was not his intention. If "no-
finds-no-pay" marine salvage contracts are not, by definition,
commercial contracts, then the matter of whether risks under the
contract were typical within the salvage industry seems quite
unimportant.
The risk category for "investment" was found to be satisfied
in Salini, for example, and the fact that other construction
contracts might or might not allocate risks in a similar manner was
simply not at issue in that case. 133 On the other hand, the Joy
Mining Mach. Ltd. tribunal, heavily relied on by the Malaysian
Historical Salvors Arb. arbitrator, found that risk under the
contract at issue in that case "[was] not different than that involved
129. Id.
130. Id. See also Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., supra note 41, $ 58; SCHREUER, supra note 8,
at 139 ("Non-recurring transactions such as simple sales and purchases of goods or short-
term commercial credits clearly do not qualify as investments.").
131. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, $ 129.
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. See Salini, supra note 70, at 622-23.
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in any commercial contract." " The Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. panel
forcefully cautioned against allowing normal sales contracts in the
international marketplace to be thought of as investments "for the
sake of a stable legal order." 135
Of course, MHS v. Malaysia is easily distinguished from Joy
Mining Mach. Ltd. In Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., the agreement was,
at heart, a sales contract, albeit a quite complex one, which
required some additional activities by the company that were
ancillary to the contract's primary purpose (to procure mining
equipment). 136 The MHS contract with Malaysia was a service
contract (marine salvage), not a procurement contract. "' In MHS
v. Malaysia, the sale of salvaged items was executed by the host
State, and Christie's Amsterdam auctioned items on Malaysia's
behalf only after MHS's primary obligations under the contract
(salvage, recovery, and restoration of items from the shipwreck
site) were complete. By improperly equating the criterion of risk
assumed under the contract with the broader principle that
ordinary commercial contracts are not investments, the arbitrator
vastly undervalued the substantial weight that should have been
afforded to the risk component of the Diana salvage contract. This
is particularly puzzling, since there was no dispute that MHS bore
all of the risk under the contract. The effect of the arbitrator's
finding that all of the contract risks were ordinary commercial
risks, coupled with the innovation that the risk hallmark must be
satisfied qualitatively, led to a most illogical conclusion: even
though MHS bore all of the risk, it somehow did not adequately
satisfy the ICSID requirement that an investor merely participate
in the risk of the agreement.
E. Justification for Greater Emphasis of the Economic
Development of the Host State
The final category considered by the sole arbitrator in
determining whether the salvage contract in MHS v. Malaysia
constituted an "investment" under the ICSID Convention was the
economic development of the host State, Malaysia. Because he
found that MHS could "only superficially satisfy the so-called
134. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., supra note 41, 57.
135. Id. 58.
136. Id. 55.
137. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, IT 7-10.
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classical Salini features of investment," referring to his analysis of
the four previously discussed categories, the arbitrator determined
that this last category should assume much greater emphasis than
if the Salini hallmarks had been qualitatively satisfied. '"
On its face, this may seem reasonable. A weak showing of one
or more factors in a multi-factor test often justifies requiring a
stronger showing of remaining factors. For example, an ICSID
tribunal used a multi-factor test based on international law in this
way to determine whether a corporation was a State entity for
jurisdictional purposes. 139 In MHS v. Malaysia, however, it is worth
reflecting on the manner in which the arbitrator determined that
the previous factors were only met superficially. Recall that the
first factor, regularity of profit and return, was not considered by
the arbitrator to be one of the classical Salini hallmarks, but in any
event its absence was excused, as discussed in Part IV.A. Thus, on
the MHS v. Malaysia facts, the profit and return factor may not
have contributed toward a finding of investment, but neither
should it have detracted nor required MHS to make a stronger
showing of the economic development factor.
The arbitrator's very brief analysis of the second factor,
contributions of the investor to the host State, found that there
was no dispute that MHS had contributed time, money, and effort
in completing its work. ' On the other hand, the award is
somewhat vague as to whether the arbitrator considered the
requirement to be substantially satisfied, though the negative
comparison to prior ICSID cases strongly suggests that he did
not. 11 In addition, comparing the MHS v. Malaysia facts with
previous cases having to do with large, infrastructure-oriented
projects such as Salini, where the contract involved the
construction of a highway, indicates that the arbitrator likely
blurred the line considerably between the contribution and
economic development factors.
Some overlap of the "investment" requirements is to be
expected. But it is an odd exercise in circular logic to blur the lines
138. Id. 112.
139. See Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, $$ 71-89, Jan. 25, 2000, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListC
oncluded.
140. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 109; see discussion supra Part
IV.A.
141. See discussion supra Part IV.B, especially note 88 and accompanying text.
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such that the economic development factor negatively impacts the
contribution factor, only to require a greater showing of economic
development because the contribution factor is not adequately
met. As previously noted, it seems more equitable to use the
holistic, overlapping approach to extend jurisdiction than to deny
it. 141
Similarly, though the contract with time extensions actually
took four years to complete, and though existing precedent
suggests that it is entirely appropriate to consider these extensions
when determining whether the duration hallmark was satisfied, the
arbitrator chose not to take the extensions into account. ' This is
so even though the extensions were made by mutual consent of the
parties. '" Thus, instead of focusing on the actual duration of work
performed by MHS, the arbitrator found that this third factor was
only quantitatively satisfied, because the underlying contract failed
to promote the economy and development of the host State, and
because it was only a matter of "fortuity" that it took longer than
the original eighteen-month term to complete the work. 145 And as
with the contribution factor, there appears to be no precedent for
distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative satisfaction of
the duration factor.
Finally, recall that MHS assumed all of the risks under the
contract, even though the risk characteristic merely requires that
the investor participate in the risk. " Because these risks were
borne in the context of a "no-finds-no-pay" salvage contract,
however, the arbitrator treated them as "ordinary commercial
risks." 14 7 Once again, though prior precedent provided no real
guidance on this point, the arbitrator focused on whether the risk
characteristic was satisfied qualitatively, and found that it was not.
With the arbitrator's justifications for requiting greater emphasis
on economic development in mind, we proceed to his analysis of
this final investment hallmark.
142. See discussion supra Part III.
143. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
144. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1 110-111; see discussion supra
Part IV.C.
145. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, $ 110-111.
146. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
147. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 112; see discussion supra Part
IV.D.
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F. Determination that "Significant" Economic Development of the
Host State is Required
The very first line of the Preamble to the ICSID Convention
suggests that one of the underlying purposes of the Convention is
to promote economic development. " As a result, economic
development of the host State is generally considered the fifth
factor for determining whether there is "investment" under the
Convention. 149
As the arbitrator correctly noted, there is a divide within
ICSID jurisprudence as to whether contracts need to make a
significant contribution to the economic development of the host
State. 150 Some important cases, such as Salini, do not mention that
the contribution must be significant. '-" The MHS v. Malaysia
arbitrator hypothesized that the Salini tribunal would likely have
found the contractor's contribution to be significant had they
considered the question. 152 Other panels, such as those in L.E.S.I.-
DIPENTA and Bayindir, ruled that the notion of significance is
already present where the classical Salini criteria of investment are
satisfied. "3 On the other hand, the Joy Mining tribunal found that
investment for purposes of ICSID jurisdiction requires that 'the
contribution to the economic development of the host State must
be "significant." 15
The arbitrator found that "the weight of authorities cited
swings in favor of requiring a significant contribution" to the
economic development of the host State. " The arbitrator
expressed the concern that if significant economic development
were not required, then every contract would satisfy "investment,"
regardless of the quantum of benefit to the host State's economy. 116
Of course, this logic fails to take into consideration the arbitrator's
own admonition that ordinary commercial contracts are not
considered investments for ICSID jurisdiction. 17 In addition, the
148. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at Preamble. See SCHREUER, supra note 1 at
124-25.
149. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 140.
150. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 113.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. $$ 113, 115.
154. Id. 114.
155. Id. 123.
156. Id.
157. Id. T 112.
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arbitrator neglects to recall that the other investment factors also
must be satisfied, at least to some extent. In other words, contracts
that fail to satisfy the duration requirement, that do not subject the
private investor to significant risk or require substantial
contribution by the investor, might not qualify as "investments" in
the judgment of tribunals even if "significant" economic
contribution were not a requirement. 1-8
Further, States have additional opportunities to define
investment in order to avoid jurisdiction. Contract terms
negotiated between the parties can spell out more specifically
whether consent to ICSID jurisdiction is intended. 5 9 Contract
durations can be set below the necessary threshold, and extensions
can be denied or qualified. Bilateral and multi-lateral investment
treaties between and among States contracting to the Convention,
as well as national legislation of a contracting state, can provide a
more specific definition for investment than the default multi-
factor approach otherwise used by tribunals. 160 In addition, Article
25(4), which has been used by numerous countries, including
Jamaica and Turkey, "opens the possibility to Contracting States
to notify the Centre of classes of disputes that they would not
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre." 161 Finally,
Article 26 allows contracting States to "require the exhaustion of
local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its
consent to arbitration under [the] Convention." 112 In short, there
are a variety of ways for contracting States to avoid or delay
ICSID arbitration. Although the MHS v. Malaysia arbitrator
determined that it was necessary to show "significant" economic
development, the numerous ways that contracting States can avoid
or delay ICSID arbitration all could cut against requiring
"significant" economic development and were not considered.
Moreover, not all contracts that satisfy the minimum
economic development of the host State will satisfy the entire
multi-factor standard. Even for those cases that do meet minimum
jurisdictional requirements, it is important to remember that a
158. See discussion on the characteristics of "investment" in Part Ill.
159. SCHREUER, supra note 8, at 126-28.
160. Id. at 128-34.
161. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 25(1). See SCHREUER, supra note 8, at
134.
162. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 26. See generally SCHREUER, supra note
8, at 390-91 (providing the broad outline for this practice).
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finding of jurisdiction does not preordain a particular outcome -
the claimant must still prevail on the merits.
G. Is There "Significant" Economic Development of the Host
State?
Accepting, for purposes of discussion, the arbitrator's
decision that economic development of the host State must be
"significant," the question is whether the economic development
of Malaysia due to MHS's performance under the contract was
significant. MHS claimed twenty-seven different bases for finding
economic development, clearly hoping that these might
cumulatively be regarded as significant. 163 Unfortunately, likening
the salvage contract to "any normal service contract," the
arbitrator found that any economic benefit conferred to Malaysia
was short-term and thus not significant enough to be considered
"investment" for ICSID jurisdiction. 164
MHS showed some temporary benefits to the Malaysian
economy, stating that Malaysian locals were employed and trained
to do some of the salvage and restoration procedures. 165 In
addition to these temporary benefits, MHS claimed that it
imparted some knowledge to the host State by instructing
Malaysian museum officers and marine salvors in methods of
marine salvage and artifact restoration. 16 As a result of this
training, "the Malacca Museum set up its own shipwreck and
salvage company."' 67
According to a maritime archaeologist with particular
expertise in the Southeast Asia region, the Malaysian government
used some proceeds from the Diana salvage to further the
archaeological excavation of the Nasau, a Dutch ship that sunk off
of Port Dickson, Malaysia." The Nasau wreck' is historically
163. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 134. In fact, it was a list of
seventeen items. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Comments, supra note 127,
at 7.
164. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1$ 145-46.
165. Id. 1$ 132-33.
166. Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Comments, supra note 127, at 7.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 19. Michael Flecker, The Ethics, Politics, and Realities of Maritime
Archaeology in Southeast Asia, 31 INT'L J. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY 12, 19 (2002),
available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1095-9270.2002.tb01397.x.
Michael Flecker was one of the three partners, along with Dorian Ball, originally
contracted by Malaysia to search for the Diana. Flecker eventually sold his interest to Ball,
who subsequently found and salvaged the ship.
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significant to Malaysia, as the Nasau was engaged in a battle for
control of the chief trading post located along the Malacca coast
during a battle in the early 17th century. 169 Also, Muzium Negara
Malaysia, a national museum located in Kuala Lumpur, housed a
special maritime archaeological exhibition .for at least two years
between 2001 and 2003, and the Malacca Maritime Museum
permanently houses Malaysian maritime exhibits, including some
items retrieved from the Diana. " The Malacca Maritime Museum
serves an educational purpose, but is also a tourist destination. 171
The Malaysian government has acknowledged that the Malacca
region has great tourist potential and created a multi-year plan to
restore local historical sites. 172 The magnitude of any tourist benefit
to the Malaysian economy creditable to MHS is obviously not
comparable, at least not in dollars, to the large infrastructure
projects that have featured in other prominent cases such as the
Moroccan highway construction in Salini. '73 On the other hand,
cultural and historic resources will likely be available in museums
for many decades or even centuries, and may continue to draw
tourist revenue long after large infrastructure projects become
obsolete or are replaced. Further, it is not fair to consider only the
pure transactional worth of contributions by contractors like MHS.
National pride, cultural identity, and archaeological/historical
value may be less tangible than money, but they nonetheless have
real meaning to groups that treasure and benefit from them,
including States contracting on behalf of their people.
As the arbitrator himself noted, "[i]t should not be thought
that investments of relatively small cash sums can never amount to
'investment.' Investments can be valued in ways other than pure
cash, e.g. as human capital or intellectual property rights."' 
74
Despite acknowledging that it is theoretically possible to have a
case with "significant" economic development through a small
investment, the arbitrator went on to compare MHS v. Malaysia
169. Malaysian Historical Salvors Claimant's Comments, supra note 127, at 19.
170. See Muzium Nagara Malaysia, http://www.muziumnegara.gov.my (last visited May
22, 2009); Syed Abdul Haris Bin Syed Mustapa, Showcasing Maritime Heritage Artefacts
for the Benefit of the Tourist Industry in Malaysia, 34 INT'L J. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY
211, 213-14 (2005), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.comldoi/pdf/10.1111/j.1095-
9270.2005.00055.x.
171. Mustapa, supra note 170, at 215.
172. Id. at 214.
173. See supra note 88.
174. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 139.
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unfavorably with Jan de Nul and Bayindir, two cases featuring
large public infrastructure projects of "permanent value," and
CSOB, where the contract resulted in development of the host
State's "banking infrastructure." '75 In MHS v. Malaysia, the
arbitrator summarily dismissed the benefits of tourism and marine
salvage training as "speculative." 1 7 6 Future tribunals should take
the longer view, and allow for accrual of economic benefits to host
States over time. Combined with some multiplicative or additive
calculation representing cultural and historical value to the host
State, this might allow a finding of significant economic
contribution on similar facts.
One final consideration is whether the relative size of the host
State's total economy should be a part of the calculus of significant
economic development. Suppose that a salvage contract of a
similar nature and dimension to that in MHS v. Malaysia were
made between a marine salvage company and a country with a
substantially smaller economy than Malaysia, a country with a
2006 gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately $313.2
billion. 177 Further imagine that the only factor requiring
satisfaction was significant economic development. Two
contracting States, located not too far from Malaysia, make good
examples for this hypothetical: the Solomon Islands and
Micronesia. 17' It is easy to understand how an ICSID tribunal
might find a total project value of approximately $4 million to not
be "significant" when compared to Malaysia's GDP of more than
$300 billion dollars. If the same project were to occur within the
Solomon Islands, where the GDP is several magnitudes lower than
in Malaysia, or in Micronesia, where the GDP is smaller still, the
same project would take on much greater significance proportional
to the host State's economy. 179 If cultural, historical, and other
175. Id. 1$ 141-43.
176. Id. 144.
177. CIA - The World Factbook: Country Comparisons - GDP (purchasing power
parity), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited May 22, 2009) [hereinafter World
Factbook].
178. Id. (The Solomon Island's GDP was estimated at $800 million in 2002;
Micronesia's GDP for the same year was estimated at $277 million). See also ICSID -
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting States and
Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID, at 3-4, Nov. 4, 2007, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDcRH&actionVal=S
howDocument&language=English [hereinafter List of Contracting States.
179. World Factbook, supra note 177.
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value were also factored in, contractors working with smaller
nations would have a much greater chance of having their projects
deemed investments.
But would this be fair for investors to larger countries? If
relatively small GDP contracting States like Micronesia or
Solomon Islands are hypothetically subject to jurisdiction, why
should a much wealthier contracting State like Malaysia not be
subject to ICSID jurisdiction on the same facts but for its larger
economy? "0 The hypothetical suggests that a more fair approach
would be to find some absolute value representing a minimum
economic development requirement, perhaps relative to the size of
the project, but not to the size of the host State's GDP.
Alternatively, using the broader approach to economic
development which "simply requir[es] some form of contribution
to the economy of the host State in one way or another" might be
best.' 8' It is important as well to consider that the economic
development hallmark of ICSID "investment" remains but one
characteristic of a multi-factor test, subject to appropriate
balancing. Lastly, as previously noted, jurisdiction itself is not
dispositive. In the end, claimants must still win on the merits of
their cases. The most just approach would allow close cases on the
jurisdictional question of investment to proceed to other
jurisdictional issues or to be heard on the merits.
V. CONCLUSION
The award on jurisdiction in MHS v. Malaysia is a frustrating
read. On one hand, the award provides an excellent selection and
analysis of major cases on the meaning of "investment" under the
ICSID Convention. The cases are well organized, clearly
presented, and the major approaches to the meaning of
"investment" in ICSID jurisprudence are thoroughly analyzed. 82
On the other hand, it is troubling to read a case where the
components of a multi-factor test are so blurred that they cut
against one party at virtually every turn when applied to the facts.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the award was the finding
180. Particularly when there are so many potential "outs" to ICSID jurisdiction. See
discussion in Part IV.F.
181. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1 1 126.
182. Id. T 73-106.
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that ICSID lacked jurisdiction on the "investment" question when
that seemed a fairly close call, while there were jurisdictional
issues other than "investment" that might have better justified the
arbitrator's decision. For example, there might not have been
jurisdiction because the contract did not satisfy the meaning of
"investment" under the Malaysia/UK BIT. 83 Or perhaps the
dispute did not concern an "approved project" within the BIT.'1
8
Because the case is one of first impression, the award may set an
influential precedent that "no-finds-no-pay" marine salvage cases
do not constitute "investment" for ICSID purposes. "
The arbitrator makes a strong argument that the differences
between the typical characteristics and jurisdictional approaches
are largely academic."'8 His analysis, however, shows that in close
cases, the specific approach taken may be determinative. If the
more holistic typical characteristics approach is used and too great
an overlap is made among the characteristics that cut against
jurisdiction, a "negative feedback," or "piling on" effect, may
occur. This seems to be precisely what happened in MHS v.
Malaysia.
Briefly reviewing the analysis of the five "investment"
characteristics (profit and return, contribution of the investor to
the host State, duration, risks assumed under the contract, and
resulting economic development of the host State), one sees this
negative feedback affecting multiple relationships between and
among factors. For example, the arbitrator found contributions "in
money, in kind and in industry." 18 Because the contract value was
not large, as it would be for construction of a major public
infrastructure, lack of significant economic development appears
to have undercut the facial satisfaction of the contribution
requirement, and the arbitrator required a stronger showing of the
economic development factor. Similarly, duration was
unquestionably met in a purely quantitative sense. "8 However, the
arbitrator determined that lack of significant economic
development meant that the voluntary extension of the contract by
183. Id. 41.1.
184. Id. 41.2.
185. Though as noted above, the award was annulled, and in any case future tribunals
are not bound to follow it. Supra notes 7, 67; 68.
186. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, TI 105.
187. Id. $ 109.
188. See discussion in Part IV.C.
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mutual consent of the parties should not be considered, and thus,
qualitative satisfaction of the duration criteria was not satisfied. "8
This quantitative/qualitative distinction was also introduced into
the risk characteristic. " The arbitrator found that MHS did not
satisfy the risk requirement even though MHS bore all of the risk,
and although the classical hallmark only requires the investor to
share the risk.
Further amplifying the negative feedback effect, the
arbitrator chose to require "significant" economic development of
the host State, at least in part, because the economic development
factor had already undercut several of the other "investment"
factors. The arbitrator's decision to require "significant" economic
development on the MHS v. Malaysia facts made it all but
impossible for the claimant to satisfy the ICSID "investment"
requirement, crippling any opportunity MHS might have had to
have the case heard on its merits, or at least proceed to other
jurisdictional questions.
It would likely make little difference so long as "significant"
economic development were needed, but if an elevated showing of
economic development had not been required, one cannot help
but wonder whether the outcome would have been different. MHS
contributed substantially to at least one new industry in Malaysia,
the marine salvage industry, and made positive contributions to
the country's cultural and historical identity. 191 By recovering and
restoring numerous materials for Malaysian museums, MHS also
contributed meaningfully to the growing tourism industry. " If
"significant" economic development means that only substantial
monetary contributions allow ICSID jurisdiction, perhaps this
important investment factor should be recalibrated to allow for
longer term and cumulative positive effects from cultural,
historical, archaeological, and other development.
Considering the alternative approaches to measuring
economic development, the ease with which Malaysia could have
limited ICSID access in advance, and the other jurisdictional
deficiencies that were not investigated by the arbitrator, MHS v.
Malaysia may signal a substantial narrowing of the historically
189. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, 1$ 110-11.
190. Id. 112.
191. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
192. Malaysian Historical Salvors Arb., supra note 1, T 215.
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liberal definition of "investment" in ICSID arbitration, among at
least some ICSID arbitrators.
Fortunately, a more liberal trend could be emerging that
places the investment requirement in its proper context, one which
will allow more cases to be heard on their merits. This is illustrated
not only by the annulment of the MHS v. Malaysia award, but also
by an award released the day before the annulment. "9 In that
award the tribunal expressed the view that because there are
highly diverging views on what constitutes 'development'... [a]
less ambitious approach should [] be adopted, centered on the
contribUtion of an international investment to the economy of
the host state, which is indeed normally inherent in the mere
concept of investment as shaped by the elements of
contribution/duration/risk, and should therefore in principle be
presumed. 194
A rebuttable presumption in favor of finding economic
development would likely be warmly greeted by international
investors, but such an investor-friendly jurisdictional approach is
not in keeping with arbitral precedent, as discussed above, and
should not be needed if tribunals simply embrace a less restrictive
definition of "investment."
193. See Vis-Dunbar, supra note 7.
194. Phoenix Action, Ltd. V. Czech Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/06/5,
Award (April 15, 2009), 1 85, available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=viewC
ase&reqFrom=Home&caseld=C74 (emphasis in original).
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